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This research studies the use of gendered mental-health
labels, such as “crazy,” “hysterical,” “insane,” and
“emotionally unstable,” in Canadian custody cases
decided between 2000 and 2016. Building on Judith
Mosoff’s work on gender and mental health stigma in
custody proceedings, it maps how these “pop-psychology”
labels impact custody litigation. This investigation reveals
that mental-health labels serve to discredit the mother,
attack her parenting abilities, and distract from her
allegations of violence by the father. The article also
explores fathers’, mental health experts’, and judges’ roles
in framing the mother’s credibility and parental capacity
with regard to her alleged mental instability. It observes
how the unjustified use of mental-health labels can backfire
against the father, and how mothers can link out-of-court
mental-health insults to legal arguments supporting their
claim for custody. Although producing varied
consequences, mental-health labels often reinforce gender
biases and myths regarding domestic violence.

*

B.C.L. & LL.B., McGill University (2016), LL.M., University of
Toronto (2017), LL.M. candidate, University of Cambridge (20172018). The author would like to thank Professor Brenda Cossman for
her precious advice, support and supervision in the completion of this
article, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and
valuable comments.

58 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

INTRODUCTION
The trope of the “crazy woman” is influential in our
society, affecting psychiatry, the media, our culture, and
popular discourses. A simple example, entering “crazy
mom” into Google returns significantly more results than
the search “crazy dad.” Our society’s historical obsession
with labeling women as crazy has had important
implications for women in numerous aspects of their lives.
This article explores the intersection between
gender and mental health stigma in the context of custody
disputes. Building on Judith Mosoff’s work on how a
mother’s mental illness negatively affects her claim for
custody, it studies how discourses and stereotypes on
mother’s mental health impact custody disputes in the
context of an opposite sex, dyadic, nuclear family. The
conflictual and gendered context of such litigation creates
a fertile field for the mobilization of stereotypes about
women’s mental health.
This research analyses 120 cases involving the
gendered use of a mental-health label, such as “crazy” or
“hysterical,” rendered by Canadian courts between 2000
and 2016. It finds that ableist labels are used especially by
fathers, but also by judges and experts, to diminish
mothers’ credibility and attack their parental capacity.
Allegations of mental instability are rarely fully successful,
but create space for the use of gendered stereotypes,
distract the court from the analysis of the father’s violence,
and are rarely punished. Finally, mothers also use mentalhealth labels to testify that the father has called them
“crazy,” yielding mitigating results in trying to attach legal
consequences to this verbal abuse. Whether at trial or out
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of court, it remains too acceptable to characterize mothers
as mentally unstable.
GENDER AND MENTAL ILLNESS
The gendered nature of mental illness illuminates the study
of mental-health labels in custody disputes. Far from being
a mere coincidence, fathers’ and professionals’ tendency to
pathologize mothers can be traced back to the beginnings
of psychiatry, calling for scepticism regarding such
allegations: in a patriarchal society, any woman can be
“crazy.”
Women outnumber men in diagnoses of mental
illness since the eighteenth century,1 when hysteria was so
frequently diagnosed that it was said to be “a woman’s
natural state.”2 Anorexia, depression, borderline
personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
premenstrual dysphoric disorder and anxiety disorders are
in turn today’s “women’s diseases.”3 Phyllis Chesler
uncovers the role of patriarchy in shaping the ideals of
mental health: “What we consider ‘madness’, whether it
appears in women or in men, is either the acting out of the
devalued female role or the total or partial rejection of
one’s sex-role stereotype.”4 Jane Ussher also exposes the
1

2

Jane M Ussher, The Madness of Women: Myth and Experience
(London: Routledge, 2011) at 1 [Usher, “The Madness of Women”].
Ibid at 9.

3

Ibid at 10–11.

4

Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1972) at 56.
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historical gender biases of psychiatry, namely the
pathologization of femininity and the chastisement of
women who deviate from expected gender roles. She
argues that women—particularly working class, old,
lesbian, and Black women—are routinely overdiagnosed
by mental health professionals.5
Feminist critics of psychiatry also link women’s
psychological distress with sexism and violence against
women. Discrimination and sexual violence are associated
with depression,6 self-hate,7 substance abuse,8 posttraumatic stress, and anxiety.9 Feminists argue that
psychology “depoliticise[s] the roots of women’s
distress”10 and that the concept of mental illness obscures
oppression by suggesting “an internal pathology that can
be incontrovertibly categorised and cured by
biomedicine.”11 The pathologization of mothers to conceal
domestic violence, that will be explored in this article,
exemplifies this relationship between female madness and
male violence.
5

Ussher, “The Madness of Women”, supra note 1 at 76.

6

Ibid at 37.

7

Mary B Ballou & Laura S Brown, Rethinking Mental Health and
Disorder: Feminist Perspectives (New York, N.Y.: Guilford Press,
2002) at xv.

8

Lynn H. Collins, “Alcohol and Drug Addiction in Women:
Phenomenology and Prevention” in Ballou & Brown, supra note 7.

9

Ussher, “The Madness of Women”, supra note 1 at 38.

10

Ibid at 35.

11

Ibid at 4.
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MENTAL ILLNESS AND CUSTODY
Research on custody and mental illness situates the biases,
factors, and roles that can be expected to affect cases
involving gendered mental-health labels. Particularly,
Judith Mosoff explores, in “Motherhood, Madness, and
Law”, how mental-health labelling helps sever mentally
disabled mothers’ relationship with their children.12 She
investigates how the “psychiatric paradigm” justifies
denying a mother any sense of privacy by defining her as a
danger to her child.13 Mosoff takes issue with the uncritical
reliance of judges on psychiatric expertise, viewed as
“objective” and “scientific.” She also notes the
dissemination of psychological ideas in popular culture,
resulting in a reliance on “pop psychology” to evaluate a
mother’s fitness as a parent.14 In “‘A Jury Dressed in
Medical White and Judicial Black’”, Mosoff further
presents custody proceedings as explicitly adversarial
processes where “psychiatric evidence is usually the major
aspect of the inquiry”15 and “becomes a ‘battle of the
experts.’”16 Women face important biases as “an expert’s
12

Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45:2 UTLJ
107 at 108 [Mosoff, “Motherhood”].

13

Ibid at 110.

14

Ibid at 111.

15

Judith Mosoff, “‘A Jury Dressed in Medical White and Judicial Black’:
Mothers with Mental Health Histories in Child Welfare and Custody”
in Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide:
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997) 227 at 229.

16

Ibid at 228.
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mental health category or diagnosis becomes a ready vessel
for a gendered interpretation of parenting.”17
Anat S. Geva’s 2012 research in turn explores how
judges report factoring mental health in custody
determinations, stating that, although an important factor,18
“parental mental illness is not an a priori reason to deny
custody.”19 Geva identifies three main bases for deciding
the impact of the mental illness on the case.
First, judges may apply a favourable presumption
to the mentally ill parent, either by assuming that the illness
is at its worse during litigation,20 or by being skeptical of
the parent who bases the custody claim on the other
parent’s diagnosis.21 However, Diane T. Marsh rather finds
that mentally ill people’s inability to parent “is often taken
for granted, rather than properly assessed.”22
Second, judges rely on mental health experts,
despite their lack of awareness of “common reasoning and

17

Ibid.

18

Anat S Geva, “Judicial Determination of Child Custody When a Parent
is Mentally Ill: A Little Bit of Law, A Little Bit of Pop Psychology,
and A Little Bit of Common Sense” (2012) 16:1 UC Davis J Int L &
Pol’y 1 at 17–18.

19

Ibid at 1.

20

Ibid at 27.

21

Ibid at 35.

22

Diane T Marsh, “Parental Mental Illness: Issues in Custody
Determinations” (2009) 23:1 Am J Fam L 28 at 29.
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research errors committed by these professionals.”23 This
reliance is strongly criticized by Mosoff who states that
that “psychiatrists are poor assessors of risk”24 and ground
their opinions in “a medical model of mental disorder,”25
which “assumes that disability originates from impairment,
a defect in the individual which may be fixed by an
appropriate professional.”26
Third, judges rely on their personal knowledge—or
“common sense”27—regarding mental illness; however,
they may overestimate “their understanding of the
psychological
factors
relevant
to
post-divorce
adjustment.”28 The considerable discretion that judges
enjoy and the subtlety of mental health discrimination
makes determining whether mental health is considered
appropriately a difficult task.29
Research on custody and mental illness focuses on
parents with serious and diagnosed mental illnesses,
leaving the coding of “normal” (undiagnosed) women as
“crazy” unaddressed. This field of study provides a point
of comparison for the exploration of the use of “poppsychology” labels (such as hysterical, crazy, nuts…).
Building on Mosoff’s work on perceptions of mentally ill
23

Geva, supra note 18 at 8.

24

Mosoff, “Motherhood”, supra note 12 at 134.

25

Ibid at 132.

26

Ibid at 132.

27

Geva, supra note 18 at 1–2.

28

Ibid at 2.

29

Ibid at 18.
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mothers in the judicial system, this research frames how
gender, mental health stigma, and pop psychology intersect
to affect mothers in custody disputes, even absent actual
diagnoses and expert testimony.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CUSTODY
The prevalence of domestic violence cases requires a brief
overview of how gender biases penalize victims of male
violence in custody litigation. This background provides
the tools to critically assess courts’ engagement with
domestic violence concerns in the context of fathers’
pathologization of mothers, as well as their frequent choice
of shared custody arrangements.
Abundant feminist literature has detailed the
disadvantages faced by mothers in custody disputes.
Notably, Susan Boyd demonstrates that family law has
been shaped by the lobbying of fathers’ rights activists and
that a language of “equality” and “neutrality” masks biases
favouring fathers.30 Judges further view women as less
credible than men,31 and hold mothers to higher standards
of proof and of good parenting.32 Mothers who allege
30

Susan B Boyd, Child custody, law, and women’s work (Don Mills, Ont:
Oxford University Press Canada, 2003) [Boyd, “Child Custody”];
Susan B Boyd, “Demonizing mothers: Fathers’ rights discourses in
child custody law reform processes” (2004) 6:1 Journal of the
Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community Involvement 52.

31

Megan Shipley, “Reviled Mothers: Custody Modification Cases
Involving Domestic Violence” (2011) 86 Indiana LJ 1587 at 1596–
1597.

32

Boyd, “Child Custody”, supra note 30; Joan S Meier, “Domestic
Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial
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domestic violence or violence against the child (which
often co-occur)33 face additional biases. Despite its
widespread nature, especially among litigating families,
courts repeatedly fail to acknowledge fathers’ violence.34
The difficulty of demonstrating family violence is
exacerbated by stereotypes that mothers make false
allegations of violence.35 Despite victims’ tendency to
minimize and cover-up domestic violence, courts and
assessors routinely assume that women who allege
violence exaggerate.36 Their distrust is intensified by
misconceptions about the purely physical nature of
domestic violence, even though “‘[m]inor’ violence is a
predictor of severe injuries in battered women, as is
Resistance and Imagining the Solutions” (2003) 11:2 Am UJ Gender
Soc Pol’y & L 657 at 687.
33

Lundy Bancroft, Jay G Silverman & Daniel Ritchie, The batterer as
parent: Addressing the impact of domestic violence on family dynamics
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011) at 9.

34

Desmond Ellis, “Divorce and the Family Court: What Can be Done
about Domestic Violence?” (2008) 46:3 Family Court Review 531 at
531; Peter G Jaffe, Nancy KD Lemon & Samantha E Poisson, Child
custody and domestic violence: A call for safety and accountability
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003) at 16; Meier, supra
note 32.

35

Adrienne Barnett, “‘Like Gold Dust These Days’: Domestic Violence
Fact-Finding Hearings in Child Contact Cases” (2015) 23:1 Feminist
Legal Studies 47 at 71; Christine Harrison, “Implacably hostile or
appropriately protective? Women managing child contact in the
context of domestic violence” (2008) 14:4 Violence Against Women
381 at 395.

36

Meier, supra note 32 at 684–685; Elizabeth M Schneider, Battered
women and feminist lawmaking (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008) at 104–108.
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psychological abuse by the perpetrator.”37 Mothers who
denounce violence are painted as “hostile” and
“obstructive,” especially if they appear angry or
emotional.38 This context illuminates the following
discussion on the labelling of mothers who allege violence
as “hysterical.” Also relevant is the fact that “batterers . . .
commonly retaliate with accusations that their partners are
actually the aggressors, are unfit, or are systematically
brainwashing [or ‘alienating’] the children.”39 These
allegations marginalize concerns regarding the father’s
violence, inviting judges to default to the “neutral” position
of assigning blame equally to both parties.40 This study will
observe whether allegations of craziness and mental
instability serve a similar function.
Even when mothers succeed in demonstrating
fathers’ violence, batterers are routinely granted contact,
and even shared or full custody,41 because judges assume,
wrongly, that violence against the mother does not harm
the child or stops after the separation.42 Even evidence of
37

Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending battered women on trial: Lessons from
the transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 278.

38

Barnett, supra note 35 at 51, 53; Meier, supra note 32 at 691.

39

Jaffe, Lemon & Poisson, supra note 34, ch 2.

40

Shipley, supra note 31 at 1597; Meier, supra note 32 at 692–696.

41

Linda C Neilson, “Spousal Abuse, Children and the Legal System:
Final Report For Canadian Bar Association, Law for the Futures Fund
March, 2001” (2001); Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child
Relationship at All Cost?: Supervised Access Orders in the Canadian
Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 277.

42

Sheehy, supra note 37 at 221; Jaffe, Lemon & Poisson, supra note 34
at 9; Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood
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violence against the child may be disregarded because of
the presumed importance of maintaining the father-child
relationship at all cost.43 This treatment of family violence
allegations allows batterers to use the legal system as a tool
to continue to harass, intimidate, control, and terrorize
mothers.44 Shared parenting orders also grant violent
fathers increased opportunities to exert their violence and
control, leading to consequences ranging from physical and
emotional violence to abductions and even feminicides and
infanticides.45
METHODOLOGY
This research is based on an analysis of discourses and
trends in custody cases in which gendered labels are used
in relation to the mother. First, a literature review of the
area of gender and mental health allowed for the
preliminary identification of words often used to describe
women’s madness, such as “hysterical” and “crazy.”

in Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 21 Can J Women & L
315.
43

Kelly, supra note 42.

44

Ellis, supra note 34 at 531–532; Colleen Varcoe & Lori G. Irwin, “‘If
I Killed You, I’d Get the Kids’: Women’s Survival and Protection
Work with Child Custody and Access in the Context of Woman
Abuse” (2004) 27(1) Qualitative Sociology 77 at 85.

45

Helen Rhoades, “The Rise and Rise of Shared Parenting Laws: A
Critical Reflection” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 75; Boyd 2003, supra note
30.
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Second, searches were conducted on Lexis Nexis
and SOQUIJ with the following search words, for a total of
1,130 cases:46














Hysteria, hysterical, hystérique, hystérie
Neurotic, neurosis, névrosée, névrose
Crazy, folle, fou, folie
Paranoid, paranoïaque (later excluded)
Insane
Delusional
Maniacal, maniac, maniaque
Basket case
Nuts
Deranged, dérangée
Malade mentale, sick […] head, malade
dans la tête
Pathological, pathologique
Emotionally unstable

Irrelevant cases were excluded from the results, for a total
of 524 cases.
Third, the remaining cases were sorted according to
who was described by the label in order to verify that the
search word was indeed a gendered label.
46

Lexis Nexis searches included the following filters: Court cases (All
Canadian Court Cases); Legal Topics: Family Law  Common Law
Jurisdictions [Family Law]  Custody and access; DATE(>=2000).
Searches on SOQUIJ included the following filters: Plan de
classification: famille  garde d’enfant; DATE(2000-2016). Negative
search words were added to exclude recurrent irrelevant results.
SOQUIJ searches include feminine and masculine forms of a word.
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Fourth, for those labels that were confirmed as
“feminine”47 (all except “paranoid”), cases in which the
label targeted a child were excluded, and remaining cases
where sorted according to the function of the label to allow
for the preliminary identification of recurring themes.
Fifth, for each label, the most relevant cases were
selected to be more closely analysed, eliminating cases in
which the label was used against the father or was
irrelevant to the central issues of the case. At this step, 120
cases were identified as most relevant.
Sixth, thematic issues previously identified were
refined based on the observation of patterns, problems, and
unusual issues among those 120 relevant cases. Cases were
classified into four (overlapping) categories. In each
category, rates of success were calculated based on
whether the mother obtained what she asked for in terms of
custody or access. Because the outcome of any given case
can depend on a number of factors, closer attention was
paid to the judge’s reasoning.
RESULTS
The 120 selected cases reveal different functions of
gendered mental-health labels. Part I discusses the use of
these labels to discredit the mother (25 cases), especially
when she alleges violence by the father. Part II addresses
the use of mental-health labels in relation to the mother’s
parental capacity (60 cases). Part III explores the
consequences that can flow from a judge’s disapproval of
47

A “feminine” label was applied more often to mothers and daughters
than to fathers and sons.
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the father’s allegation of mental illness (17 cases). Finally,
part IV observes the effectiveness of mothers’ strategy to
testify to the father’s out-of-court affirmations that she has
mental health problems (40 cases).48
Allegations of mental instability are often used by
violent fathers. Although they have a low success rate
when they are not confirmed by the judge’s observations at
trial or expert testimony, these allegations shift the focus
away from family violence concerns. Judges may succeed
in identifying and criticizing opportunistic, illogical, and
unsubstantiated allegations of mental instability. However,
fathers are rarely penalized, making these inflammatory
statements a safe way to try to undermine the mother’s
case. When it is the mother who brings up the issue by
testifying that the father called her “crazy,” she invites an
analysis of the father’s abuse rather than her mental state.
Mental-health insults are easily trivialized by the court;
however, they contribute to the mother’s case when they
are attached to broader concerns regarding the father’s
violence, lack of parenting abilities, or alienation of the
children.
PART I: MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS AND
MOTHERS’ CREDIBILITY
Mental-health labels are used to discredit mothers in 25
cases, including 16 victories for the father. These cases
raise two main concerns. First, judges lack the formal
training to impose improvised mental-health diagnoses on
mothers. Second, the labelling of mothers as mentally ill
48

A single case may involve allegations falling under more than one
category.
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serves to discredit allegations of violence. Although fathers
often fail to pathologize the mother who alleges violence,
the combined roles of fathers, experts, and judges lead to a
shift in focus from the father’s violence to the mother’s
delusionality.
Ableist labels rhetorically dramatize the mother’s
lack of credibility. For example, rather than asserting that
she is a liar, the father can say that she is a “pathological
liar;”49 rather than finding that she exaggerates, the judge
can find that she is “hysterical.” Moreover, the labelling of
a bad litigant as a “hysterical mother” need not be based on
an actual diagnosis; it can come from the judge’s
assessment of the mother’s conduct. In J.D.P. v R.M.P., the
roles of judge and psychiatrist are conflated, as the judge
finds that the mother’s mental state, which “impacts every
aspect of [the] case,”50 was apparent even before her
medical records were produced:
[The mother’s] mental state is a very serious
concern. It does not take any formal training
to perceive this. Her history of delusional
thinking and her disordered recounting of
events during the trial raise serious concerns
as to her credibility. . . . Most significantly,
and like many persons with obsessive
thought patterns or delusional thinking, R.

49

ADB v DE, 2007 NSSC 182, 2007 CarswellNS 289 (WL Can) [ADB].

50

JDP v RMP, 2010 BCSC 1873 at para 98, [2010] BCJ No 2624 (QL).
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seems to have lost the ability to doubt
herself.51
In Droit de la famille — 101255, the judge finds it
clear that the mother should remain the custodial parent,52
but still takes the time to criticize her “obvious hysteria”53
based on her aggressiveness during her testimony.54 The
judge contrasts the parents’ mental stability: “[le père] est
apparu à la Cour comme nettement plus calme et pondéré,
pour ne pas dire plus équilibré, que la [mère].”55 This
analysis impacts the mother’s request for support, as the
judge finds that the hysterical and resentful mother does
not make sufficient efforts to find gainful employment
because she wants to “make the father pay.”56
Both quotes illustrate Mosoff’s remarks regarding
the rise of pop-psychology discourse, as well as Geva’s
observations regarding judges’ reliance on their own
psychiatric knowledge. Judges are experts in credibility
findings, but are not qualified to diagnose litigants who
they may only have observed during one of the most
51

Ibid.

52

Droit de la famille — 101255, 2010 QCCS 2387 at para 65, 2010
CarswellQue 5576 (WL Can).

53

Ibid at para 20.

54

Ibid.

55

Ibid at para 5. Translation: “[the father] appeared to the Court to be
considerably calmer and more balanced, if not more stable, than the
[mother].”

56

Ibid at para 20. See also AA v SNA, 2007 BCCA 375 at para 65, [2007]
BCJ No 1656 (QL).
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stressful periods of their lives. The rhetorical
pathologization of mothers is also circular: the mother’s
mental illness makes her not credible, and her lack of
credibility evidences her mental illness.57 The discourse of
the hysterical litigant echoes feminist literature both in
psychiatry, regarding the disproportionate pathologization
of women, and in law, regarding the biased evaluation of
women’s credibility. “Common sense” psychiatric
evaluations of mothers are all the more problematic as they
serve to discredit allegations of violence.
MOTHERS’ CREDIBILITY AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE
Mental-health labels used to discredit the mother are
strongly correlated with allegations that the father is violent
(23/25 cases). Fathers employ this strategy to shift the
focus from their violence to the mother’s instability, with
limited success (four victories in 12 cases). However, when
it is the expert (six cases) or the judge (five cases) who
raises the issue of mental health, mothers discredited as
mentally ill are found “delusional” in their belief that the
father has been violent and lose the case.
i. Allegations by the Father
In 12 cases, the father brings the mother’s mental health
into question as a direct response to an allegation of

57

See Swaren v Swaren, 2007 ABQB 193 at para 21, [2007] 8 W.W.R.
151.
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abuse.58 The father’s rhetoric can obscure the actual cause
of the mother’s lack of believability, as calling a mother
“delusional” leaves unclear whether she is lying or
mistaken. Davie v. Davie illustrates this possible
confusion: the father “asserts that [the mother] is
‘delusional’ and/or exaggerating to discredit him.”59 In
Johal v. Johal, the mother asserts that the father is “a
drinker, irresponsible and prone to abuse,”60 to which the
father responds that “she either believes these things, and
is therefore delusional, or, alternatively, has simply boldly,
barefacedly lied to this Court.”61 The judge finds the
father’s pathologization of the mother to be unwarranted.62
The mother is not mentally unstable, but rather an
“immature young women [who] allowed herself to indulge
in some rather regrettable descriptions of events that are
quite transparent exaggerations.”63
When uncorroborated, fathers’ allegations that the
mother is crazy for denouncing violence have limited
success (4 victories/12 cases). Nonetheless, this rhetoric
58

See for example Ganie v Ganie, 2014 ONSC 7500, [2014] OJ No 6332
(QL); Herar v Herar, 2012 BCSC 1257 at para 18, [2012] BCJ No
1770 (QL); EBS v LJS, 2006 BCSC 968 at para 17, [2006] BCJ No
1551 (QL); CLB v JAB, 2016 SKCA 101 at para 5, [2016] SJ No 430
(QL); ADB, supra note 49 at para 6.

59

Davie v Davie, 2015 ONCJ 662 at para 22, [2015] OJ No 6215 (QL).

60

Johal v Johal, 2009 BCSC 139 at para 84, [2009] BCJ No 195 (QL)
[Johal].

61

Ibid at para 83.

62

Ibid at para 85.

63

Ibid at para 87.
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remains worrisome. Fathers can change the narrative and
move the focus away from their violence to the mother’s
mental state. The issue becomes which, of the father’s
violence or the mother’s insanity, can be better
corroborated. Faced with diametrically opposed assertions
that the father is violent or that the mother is insane, two
judges renounce making a finding on either issue,64
echoing feminists researchers’ observations that violent
fathers’ inflammatory accusations may lead judges to take
a “neutral” stance towards litigants.65 The pathologization
of mothers who are “too concerned” about the father’s
violence can also interact with allegations of parental
alienation. In Droit de la famille — 12943, the mother
testifies that she feared for her life, to which the father
replies that she is “deranged”66 and needs professional
care.67 Both the judge and expert find the father abusive
and unrepentant. Nonetheless, the pathologization of the
mother allows the expert to recommend shared custody to
prevent further parental alienation,68 and leads the judge to
force the children to spend time with their father.69 This
case is suggestive of the tension faced by mothers who
must simultaneously protect their child from a violent
father and support the father-child relationship.70
64

EBS v LJS, supra note 58; CLB v JAB, supra note 58 at para 12.

65

Meier, supra note 32 at 692.

66

Droit de la famille — 12943, 2012 QCCS 1747 at para 37, [2012] JQ
No 3760 (QL).

67

Ibid at para 56.

68

Ibid at para 63.

69

Ibid at paras 43, 97, 98.

70

Varcoe & Irwin, supra note 44 at 92.
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ii. Expert Testimony
Judges are more receptive to allegations of mental
instability coming from experts, who may refute testimony
on the father’s violence by labelling the mother
“delusional.” In the six cases where an expert pathologizes
the mother, the father wins. The relevance of expert
testimony is exemplified in C.E.L. v. D.C.A., where the
expert raises the question of “whether or not [the mother]
has fabricated an allegation [of sexual assault of the child]
or whether she is delusional in her belief that the sexual
abuse occurred, because the evidence she presents does not
point to this conclusion.”71 To further ascertain whether the
mother has fabricated the abuse, the judge orders the
disclosure of documentation pertaining to her complaints
of sexual violence as a child. This example resonates with
Mosoff’s observation that mentally ill mothers are stripped
of their privacy. The mother’s mental health and personal
history are seen as the way to determine whether the father
sexually assaulted the child, in lieu of a focus on evidence
regarding the father or the child.
Experts label mothers as delusional when they
persist in their belief that violence has occurred, despite
findings to the contrary. In R.R.W.E.S.-V. v. S.E.D.V., the
expert recommends therapy for the mother to address “her
excessive anxiety and poor stress coping skills [that] have
led to her delusional thinking with regard to the alleged
sexual abuse.”72 According to the expert, the mother’s
71

CEL v DCA, 2016 BCPC 147 at para 12, [2016] BCJ No. 1077 (QL).
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“delusional beliefs” indicate that she will not refrain from
talking negatively about the father.73 This testimony is
puzzling: would a sane mother talk respectfully about the
father she believes assaulted their child, or are persistent
mistaken beliefs in sexual assault always pathological?
Considering the law’s failure to identify cases of family
violence, the latter deduction is problematic.
Pointing to a precise disorder with causes and
symptoms is secondary to the vague pathologization of the
mother’s beliefs. In T.L.L.L. v. J.J.L., the expert “raised the
possibility that the mother may have a delusional belief
system or some other mental health issue”74 making her
unable to accept that the children were not sexually
assaulted. This expert opinion leads to limited supervised
access for the mother. Here the expert is not using his
psychiatric expertise to diagnose the mother in order to
draw conclusions as to her credibility. Rather, unfounded
allegations of violence are perceived as symptoms pointing
to some vague and unspecified mental-health problem.
Similarly, in A.F. v. D.G., the expert “would [seriously
consider] a ‘DSM diagnosis of Shared Delusional
Disorder.’”75 The judge “acknowledges that some of the
opinions surrounding [the mother’s] mental health status is
[sic] based on limited information as there was no formal
clinical or psychological testing conducted.”76
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Nonetheless, the “specific psychological finding”77 is
unimportant, and the mother not only loses custody but is
also prevented from having any contact with the children
(as is her family), until she engages in therapy and accepts
that the father did not harm the child.78
Of particular concern is Droit de la famille —
112774, where the expert’s pathologization operates even
if the mother’s allegations of violence are not “delusional.”
The expert finds that the mother has hysterical personality
traits,79 and that she has a tendency to dramatize the
violence she was subjected to.80 This opinion factors into
the judge’s decision to increase the father’s access. This
depiction of the mother as overdramatic disregards the
propensity of women to understate the amount and severity
of violence to which they have been subjected,81 and it
blames the victim for “overreacting” to “minor” violence.
iii. Judges’ Observations
In five cases, it is the judge who labels the mother as
irrational, ensuring the father’s victory. Contrary to Geva’s
finding that judges take the stressful nature of custody
litigation into account, there is no mention in any of the
77
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cases studied that a mother’s behaviour at trial may not
reflect her usual mental state.
The mother’s false allegations of violence can be
used to conclude that she is irrational, or the mother’s
irrationality can be used to conclude that her allegations are
false. In M.P. v. G.O., the Court finds that “[t]he complaints
[of child abuse] were driven by hysteria and verged on
malicious.”82 By contrast, in Droit de la famille — 091654,
the Court comments that the mother appears sincere, but
rejects as unfounded her fear of the father: “elle s’est
montrée très subjective, elle a développé des réactions
excessives qui ne s’appuient aucunement sur la réalité.”83
The Court observes that “[le père] est calme et en contrôle
de lui-même, contrairement à la [mère] qui s’enflamme et
s’excite au point d’en devenir hystérique.”84 The reliance
on the woman’s “hysteria” and “subjectivity” gives rise to
a discourse that is both gender-coded and infantilizing.
Although these cases may truly involve false
allegations of violence, the reliance on stereotypes
regarding “hysterical” victims of domestic violence puts

82

MP v GO, 2012 ABPC 180 paras 29, 31, ACWS (3d) 382. See also KH
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mothers and children at risk.85 Judges’ typical “perception
of abused mothers as overdramatic or hysterical”86 clouds
their appreciation of violence allegations in custody
disputes. In Droit de la famille — 113953, the judge finds
that the mother is “quasi-hysterical” and lacks nuance in
her portrayal of the father—even though the expert finds
that neither parent has psychological problems.87 The judge
orders shared custody despite the conflictual situation.
Astonishingly, the judge uses the fact that the father is in a
long-term relationship with another woman to further
discredit the mother’s allegations of domestic violence.88
The pathologization of mothers’ mental state is not the only
stereotype at play, and fathers’ attempts at this
pathologization are not always successful. Nonetheless, the
insistence on mothers’ “hysteria” creates room for
stereotypes to distract the court from an unbiased analysis
of the evidence of family violence and contributes to the
documented use of sexist assumptions in custody disputes.
These assumptions hold women to higher standards of
credibility, and, when used to improperly discard
allegations of violence, can have dramatic and even deadly
consequences.
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PART II: MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS AND
MOTHERS’ PARENTAL CAPACITY
In 60 cases, the labelling of the mother as mentally unstable
suggests flaws in her parenting abilities. Mothers win 43 of
these cases, with a variable rate of success depending on
who raises the issue of their instability. When the labelling
is done by experts or judges, the father is likely to win
(10/12 cases). By contrast, fathers’ labelling is less
successful (7/48 cases), but can still distract the court from
more serious issues and needlessly increase the complexity
of the case. Experts may testify to support or contradict the
father’s pathologization of the mother. Absent medical
evidence, judges use legal arguments and credibility
findings to filter opportunistic and unmeritorious
allegations targeting the mother.
i. Allegations by the Father
Although judges89 and experts90 may also bring up the
issue, it is most frequently fathers who first invoke
mothers’ mental health to question their parenting abilities
(48/60 cases). Fathers may attempt to dramatize trivial
parenting flaws. For example, in K.M.P. v. B.J.P., the
89
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father accuses the mother of being emotionally unstable
and “characterizes her as being impatient and easily
frustrated.”91 In Johal v. Johal, the father attempts to
pathologize the mother’s practices regarding hygiene, but
the judge rejects his labelling as “neurotic,” finding the
father’s assertions “to be embellished by exaggeration.”92
The pathologization of the mother’s care work can also
reinforce gendered stereotypes about mothers’ rigid
parenting. In Kriegel v. Kriegel, the father describes the
mother as emotionally unstable, aggressive, violent,
histrionic, rigid, and regimented.93 Rather than accepting
the father’s assertion that the mother is not a good parent,
the Court finds that the parents are incapable of sharing
custody because of their animosity and different
childrearing styles, and grants custody to the mother.
Despite their limited overall success (7/48 cases),
fathers’ allegations of mental instability remain
problematic. These serious allegations warrant as much
attention as other pressing concerns, such as the father’s
violence.94 Inflammatory allegations, repeated court
appearances and dragging out the litigation process are
common abusive tactics of batterers and multiply
disruptions to the child’s life, as exemplified in Butty v.
Butty:
91
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Even if the Respondent had previously been
primary caregiver for the children, sudden
allegations of mental instability and suicidal
behaviour raised sufficient concerns about
her to “undo” the status quo. . . . As a result,
a temporary equal time arrangement was
created. “Without prejudice” from the
litigants’ perspective. But with plenty of
prejudice for two children whose daily lives
and home environment were dramatically
impacted.95
ii. The Role of Experts
Experts rarely testify directly on fathers’ allegations that
the mother is mentally ill. When they do (9 cases), they
may contradict the father’s assertions and qualify the
mother as “normal enough.” In T.M.F. v. M.H., the judge
accepts the expert’s testimony that “[has] not found [the
mother] to be sufficiently emotionally unstable that one
would say that this should begin to preclude her ability to
be an effective parent to the children.”96 Similarly, in Droit
de la famille — 0614, the father asserts that the mother is
schizophrenic or bipolar, despite findings to the contrary
by his own expert.97 The father’s conviction that the mother
is crazy makes shared custody impossible. The mother is
thus granted full custody. In two other cases, the expert
95
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rejects the father’s assertion that the mother has a mental
illness,98 but the mother loses nonetheless. By contrast,
when the expert testifies that the mother is delusional, the
father invariably wins.99
iii. The Role of Judges
In the absence of medical evidence, judges filter
unmeritorious allegations of mental instability with legal
arguments and credibility findings. Focusing on the child’s
best interest allows them to maintain the status quo in the
absence of specific reasons to change the custody
arrangement. In Yassin v. Loubani, the father alleges that
the mother is emotionally unstable,100 but the judge
comments that “[t]he children are currently in the
[mother’s] care and control, and there is no suggestion that
the [father] feels they are at risk in her care or that she cares
for them poorly.”101 The mother retains custody.
The lack of real concern for the children’s safety is
an indicator that the claim of mental instability is
unmeritorious. In Gauci v. Malone, the mother is alleged

98
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to be “emotionally unstable and an unreliable parent.”102
The fact that the father wants the mother to have generous
access to the children shows that he does not truly believe
that she is a danger to the children.103 The judge maintains
the status quo of the children residing primarily with the
mother.104
The inconsistency in the father’s positions is
similarly held against him in Kalsi v. Kalsi, where the
father is concerned “that his wife is emotionally unstable
and incapable of looking after the children”105 but still
“insists that [she] is capable of full-time employment.”106
The judge also notes that it is “very significant” that the
father “is content with joint parenting.”107 The Court
concludes that the father’s allegations are opportunistic:
“until [the father] found out that his wife had been cheating
on him for many years, he apparently had no concerns at
all with regard to his wife being a full-time mother at home
with the children while he. . . was working long hours.”108
The judge rejects the father’s application for the production
of the mother’s medical records.109 These cases suggest an
102
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effective way for judges to reject opportunistic allegations
regarding mothers’ mental health without the need for an
expert testify to their “normality.”
PART III: WHEN MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS
BACKFIRE
As we have seen, most allegations of mental instability
targeting mothers are unsubstantiated. Although judges
often reject fathers’ assertions, they express explicit
disapproval in only 17 cases. The mother wins in 14 of
these 17 cases, although judges decline to attach
consequences to the father’s problematic allegation in five
cases. In the other cases, they may decide against shared
custody, reduce the father’s access or grant the mother the
indemnification of her costs.
A. INCONSEQUENTIAL DISAPPROVAL
In five cases,110 the father’s inappropriate allegation of
mental illness is irrelevant: either the father wins, or the
mother wins for other reasons. In R.C.R. v. S.M.L., the
father’s lawyer’s comment that the mother “needs a
litigation guardian as she is insane”111 is unfounded and
“entirely inappropriate.”112 Nonetheless, the mother’s
application to set aside previous orders is rejected for lack
110
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of change in circumstances or new evidence, and because
the children’s best interests “are furthered by leaving those
orders in place.”113
In Sakve v. Sakve, the judge is very critical of both
parties’ litigious behaviour.114 The father is however more
to blame, as he “has attacked her on moral and ethical
grounds,” calling her mentally unstable, a pathological liar,
and an abusive mother.115 The judge finds that the mother
“may well be right” in saying that the father, should he
receive the increased access that is demanded, will use it
“to cause trouble for the [mother] by seeking out evidence
to use against her.”116 Nonetheless, the Court finds that the
child’s best interest “lies in as much contact as possible
with both his parents”117 and increases the father’s access
to the child. This case exemplifies courts’ failure to prevent
fathers from using the court process to frustrate mothers’
parenting.
B. DISAPPROVAL WITH CONCRETE
CONSEQUENCES
In 12 cases, the judge’s disapproval has concrete
consequences on the reasoning or outcome of the case.
Although custody disputes are not punitive in nature,
judges sanction fathers with adverse cost orders in two
113
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exceptional cases. In Miglin v. Miglin, the judge considers
the unreasonableness of the father’s behaviour, listing “his
unfounded allegations that the [mother] was emotionally
unstable, and a threat to the children.”118 The judge does
not grant the mother the complete indemnification of her
costs ($110,702.85), because “[t]here are always two sides
to every family conflict,”119 but still orders the father to pay
$79,500. In Butty v. Butty, the father “had deliberately and
knowingly fabricated serious allegations [of mental health
problems] against the [mother] for the sole purpose of
gaining strategic advantage in the custody dispute,”120
which also allows for a substantial recovery of the mother’s
costs.121
Fathers also risk being penalized for asserting that
the mother is crazy if it suggests that shared decisionmaking122 or shared custody123 is impossible. A father’s
belief and insistence that the mother is inadequate also
affects his ability to promote the child’s relationship with
the mother,124 and may even give rise to concerns regarding
118

Miglin v Miglin, [2000] OJ No 1042 at para 8.

119

Ibid at para 9.

120

Butty v Butty, 70 RFL (6th) 181 at para 42, [2009] OJ No 1887 (QL).

121

Ibid at para 71.

122

Antemia v Divito, 2010 ONSC 578 at para 86, [2010] OJ No 871 (QL)
[Antemia].

123

Droit de la famille — 0614, supra note 97 at para 130; Testa v Basi,
[2005] OJ No 3054 at paras 62, 72; Butty 2008, supra note 95 at para
428.

124

Chen v Liu, [2010] NBJ No 142.

CRAZY WOMEN AND HYSTERICAL MOTHERS

89

the alienation of the child, justifying limiting the father’s
access125 or granting custody to the mother.126
In short, although fathers’ allegations that the
mother is mentally ill are often unfounded, judges rarely
express explicit reprobation. Despite a few exceptions,
fathers still enjoy a large degree of liberty to position
themselves as competent to characterise the mother as
hysterical, delusional, or pathological with little fear of
consequences. The tolerance for these inflammatory
allegations is unlikely to deter this disruptive and sexist
practice.
PART IV: FATHERS’ OUT-OF-COURT MENTALHEALTH INSULTS
In 40 cases, the mother testifies that the father has used a
mental-health label, generally “crazy,” to insult her,
shifting the analysis from her mental state to his
reprehensible conduct. This strategy has varying degrees of
success: mothers experience 18 wins, 15 losses, and 7
mitigated results. Irrespective of the final outcome, the
importance of the name calling can be diminished with
symmetry-based analyses (ten cases), by finding that the
mother exaggerates its gravity (nine cases), by addressing
it with a warning (six cases) or for other reasons (four
cases). On the other hand, judges attach concrete
consequences to the name calling when it is part of a
demonstration that shared custody is impossible (ten
cases), that the father lacks parental capacity (five cases),
125
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that he is alienating (six cases) or that the children have
reasons to reject him (two cases).
A. INCONSEQUENTIAL DISAPPROVAL
Although judges do not condone name calling, they often
find reasons not to attach concrete consequences to this
behaviour. In 25 cases, either the name-calling has no
impact on the judge’s reasoning (17 cases), or its
importance is rhetorically diminished.
i. Symmetry-Based Rhetoric
In ten cases, the father’s behaviour is viewed negatively,
but the judge also blames the mother and uses a symmetrybased rhetoric. The gender-blind analysis of the parties’
behaviour allows for an illusion of symmetry between
insults. Sexism and ableism are never raised, even when
the father additionally called the mother a “slut” or used
other gendered insults. Shared custody is chosen in five of
these cases.
In Droit de la famille — 091942, the father
described the mother as crazy, sick, and lazy. The judge
states that the father needs to respect the mother, but
immediately switches to parents needing to respect each
other:
Ce que Madame veut et désire c’est du
respect de la part de Monsieur. […] Monsieur
doit le comprendre tout comme Madame doit
cesser de faire des esclandres pour des
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raisons futiles . . . . Il faut que chaque parent
cesse de discréditer l’autre.127
In T.E.H. v G.J.R., “[t]he father testified that the
mother was emotionally unstable, jealous, controlling and
very volatile,”128 and the mother “described the father as
extremely abusive, controlling, and jealous.”129 According
to the mother, the father frequently called her “crazy” and
a “whore.”130 The judge’s factual findings are built on a
rhetoric of symmetry of blame, making the father’s name
calling rather inconsequential:
3. This was and continues to be a toxic
relationship in which both parties display
immature and unhealthy behaviour. . . .
4. Both parties are responsible for the conflict
in their relationship. . . .
6. Both parties appear to have mental health
issues and lack insight into how their
behaviour and conduct harms the children.131
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In ordering joint custody, the judge comments that it is “the
least detrimental alternative” for the children. 132
Symmetry also serves a gender-neutral distribution
of blame in J.A. v D.A., where the father also called the
mother “crazy” and a “whore.”133 On the issue of domestic
violence, the judge states:
I am satisfied, that there were numerous
incidents of pushing, shoving and namecalling. . . . It stands to reason that the
[father], being the larger and heavier of the
two, inflicted more damage, but I conclude
that both parties were active participants on
these occasions. I find that I am unable to
ascribe more blame to one or the other.134
The Court rules in favor of shared custody. The
symmetrical description of the parties’ “conflict” illustrates
a gender-blind evaluation of domestic violence, reducing
gender dynamics to differences in size.
In these examples, the symmetry-based rhetoric
absolves fathers of the emotional violence that may be at
132
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play when they use sexist mental-health insults. In
situations of domestic violence, insistence on mutual blame
may comfort judges that they are acting as “neutral”
arbiters, while leaving unaddressed some fundamental
differences between the parties’ behaviours.135 The choice
of shared custody in half of these cases may appear
egalitarian, but it is unlikely to diminish conflict. Rather,
shared custody provides increased opportunities for name
calling, abuse, and violence.
ii. Insignificance of insults
In nine cases, the judge rejects the mother’s
characterization of the father’s behaviour as serious.
Shared custody is ordered five times, and custody to the
father, once. In Droit de la famille — 093238, the judge
suggests that the mother makes a mountain out of a
molehill: “De fait, dans son témoignage, la mère s’en est
pris au défendeur sur de petites choses qu’elle a montées
pour les rendre importantes alors qu’elles ne l’ont jamais
vraiment été.”136 In T.E.H. v G.J.R., the Court finds that
“[a]lthough there is evidence that the father was
manipulative and controlling of the mother, the mother
greatly exaggerated her evidence.”137
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This minimization of the father’s behaviour can
happen even in cases where the father threatened to kill the
mother and/or the child.138 In Johal v Johal, the mother
testified that the father called her “crazy” and threatened to
kill her and the child. The Court, concluding that there was
likely a threat, writes: “I expect what was said was in part
the product of the frustration of all the circumstances. [The
incident cannot] be taken as reliable evidence that he
actually intended to do harm to either the defendant or the
child.”139 The Court concludes by granting shared custody
until kindergarten, followed by custody to the father who
is seen as more likely to facilitate the mother’s access.
Considering the real risks of feminicide and infanticides
faced by mothers who separate from violent partners,
punishing the mother for not sufficiently fostering child’s
relationship with a father who makes death threats appears
both unfair and dangerous. Moreover, these cases reinforce
the erroneous cliché that victims overstate domestic
violence.
iii. Warnings and Second Chances
Judges also use warnings to the father with the hope that
his problematic behaviour, including calling the mother
“crazy,” will stop (six cases). In Droit de la famille —
13835, the father’s behaviour, which caused the mother to
lose her job and be hospitalized for a psychiatric evaluation
that revealed no mental illness, is described
euphemistically:
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[Le père] n’a pas eu un comportement
exemplaire après la séparation, alors qu’il
disait aux enfants que leur mère était une
« folle » et une « salope », et qu’il a tout fait
pour éloigner celle-ci [de ses enfants] en [la]
faisant passer pour une personne atteinte de
maladie mentale.140
The Court believes that the father’s inappropriate
behaviour will end naturally.141 Stating that custody
decisions are not punitive, the Court is content with a
warning: if the father continues acting immaturely, the
child’s interest may no longer lie in a shared custody
arrangement.142
This case reveals judges’ common assumption that
harm to the mother does not harm children. Clearly,
children are affected by their mother’s forced
hospitalization and loss of employment, as well as by being
repeatedly told that she is crazy. Nonetheless, the warning
justifies the judge’s failure to sanction or even prevent
controlling and sabotaging behaviour by the father, as the
shared custody arrangement that is maintained will
continue to present opportunities for abuse.
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In R.E.G. v. T.W.J.G., the Court grants custody and
a restraining order to the mother, but rejects the supervision
of the father’s biweekly access and grants him half of the
summer. The Court finds that the father must be more than
a “weekend dad.” However:
Tom needs to understand that any aggression,
any intimidation or any breach of the Court
order will not be tolerated. . . . Tom’s
parenting time with the children shall be
conditional upon the following:
(i)
That he refrains from any violent
conduct in the children’s presence and any
aggressive conduct with respect to either [the
mother or her boyfriend].143
Cases in which the father is granted another chance
despite his previous problematic, and even violent,
behaviours raise two concerns. First, judges are addressing
high-conflict litigating families with statements and orders
that encourage them to return to court, rather than with
more appropriate clear, strict, and long-lasting orders.144
Frequent litigation is particularly onerous for the custodial
parent, the domestic violence victim, or the parent with less
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resources—generally the mother.145 Second, such rulings
imply that the mother must continue to be victimized until
the father exhausts all of his chances. Domestic violence is
not a one-time error in judgment but rather an ongoing
pattern that often continues and even escalates postseparation. Such violence is unlikely to disappear with a
court warning—especially when the father knows that
perpetual litigation is more difficult (emotionally,
financially, logistically) for the mother than for him.
iv. Other Reasons not to Attach Consequences to the
Name Calling
Finally, judges decline to attach meaningful consequence
to the father’s name calling in four other cases, leading to
shared custody (ordered in three cases and agreed upon in
one).146 In Droit de la famille — 12998, the judge refuses
to make a finding regarding cruelty as a ground for divorce.
The mother says that the father threatened, intimidated and
insulted her (including by calling her “crazy”) and
controlled all financial decisions.147 The Court finds that
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attributing blame will not solve communication
problems148 and grants the divorce on a no-fault basis.149
In P.Y.Y.M. v. D.M., the father had called the
mother “crazy,” a “mental case,” and “sick,” and said he
wanted the mother dead in the presence of a child.150 The
Court orders shared custody despite the parties’ inability to
communicate to repair the children’s relationship with the
father: “unless the parties exercise joint custody, [the
children] will see their mother as the winner and their
father as the loser.”151 Maintaining and promoting the
father-child relationship is prioritized over the mother’s
safety.
In sum, judges routinely diminish the importance of
the father’s denigration of the mother, failing to address
issues of sexism, ableism, and emotional violence. Judges
rely on problematic assumptions that women exaggerate,
that children are not affected by domestic violence, that
violence within a couple is reciprocal, and that it ends with
the parents’ separation. These observations confirm and
reinforce other researchers’ explorations of biases in
custody disputes, situating these preoccupations in the
context of ableist name calling by the father.
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B. DISAPPROVAL WITH CONCRETE
CONSEQUENCES
Judges attach consequences to the mother’s testimony that
the father called them “crazy,” or rather to the broader
argument to which it pertains, in 23 cases. These cases
demonstrate a better understanding of the negative
consequences of fathers’ verbal abuse on mothers and
children, but are still often focused on other behaviours
such as physical violence and parental alienation.
i. Impossibility of shared custody
In ten cases, the name calling is part of a demonstration that
shared custody is impossible because of communication
problems or domestic violence. A conclusion to that effect
can lead to the mother having full custody even if the court
finds the father to be an otherwise good parent.152
“Communication problems” may also rise to the level of
verbal violence. In D.N.D. v. W.S.C., the father’s
“aggressive and entirely inappropriate communication and
other behaviour”153 makes shared custody impossible, as
the father’s domineering approach is not in the child’s best
interests.154 In D.L.C. v. R.J.M., the fact that the father
bullies the mother in the presence of the child (“calling her
152
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names such as pathetic, f ...... crazy, a f ...... bitch, a pig, a
witch and a crazy nut bar”)155 makes shared custody
impossible.156 The Court recognizes both the child’s and
the mother’s interest in not being subjected to this
behaviour: “This is not good modelling for a child. [Also],
no parent should be expected to subject himself or herself
to the bullying of a former spouse in the name of joint
custody.”157
ii. Parental capacity
The father’s denigration can also be part of a demonstration
of his poor parental capacity (five cases). The fact that the
father is violent,158 is a poor role model,159 or puts his desire
to humiliate the mother above the children’s interest160
requires granting custody to the mother or reducing the
father’s access. However, in these cases, the father engaged
in other problematic behaviours, like physical violence and
alcohol abuse,161 death threats,162 and repeated criminal
155
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activities.163 The mental-health insults, by themselves, are
not important enough to make the father a bad parent.
iii. Alienation
In six cases, the name calling is part of a demonstration that
the father alienates the children from the mother, leading to
an increase in the mother’s access,164 a change in custody
favouring the mother,165 or a limitation of the father’s
access.166 In C.E. v F.E., the father and the children had
reported the mother’s allegedly strange behaviour to the
family doctor, who had diagnosed her with a mental illness
without seeing her and had advised the father to try to have
her committed.167 The Court finds that the father “quite
improperly involved the children in his conflict with the
[mother].”168 The mother chooses to “respect the stated
views of the children not to have a relationship with her for
the moment”169 but obtains the right to be present at school
events. In two other cases, the father’s denigration explains
why the children reject him and leads to a conclusion that
the mother does not alienate them from the father.170
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In sum, mental-health insults may advance the
mother’s case if they are linked to a broader argument
about the impossibility of shared custody, the father’s
dangerousness or lack of judgment, or parental alienation.
By themselves, however, they most often have little
importance, as judges may reframe them as
“communication problems” and fail to engage in an
explicit analysis of sexism, ableism, and emotional
violence.
CONCLUSION
This research has mapped the ways in which gender and
mental health stigma intersect in custody disputes when
pop-psychology labels are used in relation to mothers. A
research based on labels such as “hysterical,” “neurotic,”
“crazy,” “delusional,” and “emotionally unstable” reveals
ableist and sexist discourses that are never identified as
such. Although judges may consider that insulting the
mother is inappropriate or even violent, a gender-blind
analysis is the norm. Moreover, fathers, judges and even
experts use pop-psychology discourses to dramatize
mothers’ lack of credibility and parenting flaws. Of
particular concern is the use of inflammatory allegations of
mental instability by violent fathers. Although fathers’
attempts to pathologize mothers are not always successful,
their unfounded allegations are seldom punished. Out-ofcourt assertions that the mother is crazy are not always
acted on either, as judges often use euphemistic discourses
to limit the attention that they receive. Still, some judges
appear more vigilant to opportunistic allegations of mental
instability and are harsher on fathers who display verbal
violence by calling the mother “crazy.” All in all, mental-

CRAZY WOMEN AND HYSTERICAL MOTHERS

103

health labels often lead to the pathologization of women,
gender biases, and myths regarding domestic violence.
This article builds on Judith Mosoff’s project to
expose how the mental-health discourse penalizes mentally
disabled mothers in custody and child protection
proceedings, by exploring in turn how the pop-psychology
discourse that she saw emerging can bring the mental
health of all mothers into question on the basis of gendered
interpretations of credibility and parenting abilities. It
hopes to pay tribute to Judith Mosoff’s work, which
challenged the legal system and scholars to take gender and
mental health into account, and to celebrate her spirit by
continuing to explore and denounce the ways in which our
assumed neutral system still fails to treat different people
equally.
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